This paper deals with design of the secure blockchain network framework to prevent damages from an attacker. The design is based on the hybrid theoretical approaches which is named as the . Blockchain Governance Game The framework of this game finds the best strategy towards preparation for preventing attacker a network malfunction. Analytically tractable results are obtained by using hybrid of the fluctuation theory and the mixed strategy game theory which enables to predict the moment for operations and deliver the optimal portion of backup nodes to protect the blockchain network.
INTRODUCTION
The crytocurrencies (coins and tokens) are the collection of concepts and technologies that form the basis of a digital money ecosystem. Units of currency called coins (or tokens) are used to store and transmit value among participants in the blockchain network. A blockchain is a growing list of records, called blocks, which are linked using cryptography. Blockchains which are readable by the public are widely used by cryptocurrencies. Though blockchain records are not unalterable, blockchains may be considered secure by design and exemplify a distributed computing system. One of strength of blockchain is the decentralized peer-to-peer network which eliminates a number of security risks that come with data being held centrally. Decentralized consensus has therefore been claimed with a blockchain. In the other hand, we have observed the intensive attacks which are dedicated for blockchain networks and the 51 percent attack is one of typical attacks by generating blocks with false information (transactions) because of this genion strength of the blockchain. A private blockchain which is permission has been proposed for business or government uses. This type of blockchains can be considered a middle-ground for companies that are interested in the blockchain technology in general but are not comfortable with a level of control offered by public networks (Kim, 2018a) . It is noted that the network control even for private blockchains should be minimal to avoid all security matters what the typical centralized networks have.
The is proposed in this paper and it is basically a Blockchain Governance Game stochastic game model with the fluctuation and the mixed strategies. The model is targeted to prevent blockchain based attacks (i.e., the 51 percent attack) and keep the network decentralized. We consider the case that an attacker to trying to build an alternative block chains faster than regular miners (Nakamoto, 2009 ). The defender (or controller) only manages the small percentage of nodes which are released prior the attack is happended. The results are given as joint functionals between two players of the predicted time of the first observed threshold which is crossing the half of the total nodes (i.e., 51 percents) along with values of each component upon this time.
S M F B N TOCHASTIC ODEL OR LOCKCHAIN ETWORK

Basic Stochastic Model
The antagonistic game of two players (called "A" and "H") are introduced to describe the blockchain network between a defender and an attacker. Both players compete to build the blocks either for honest or false ones. Let ( , , be probability space are related with the computing performance for generating blocks for attackers and honest nodes in the blockchain network. They will represent the actions of player A (an attacker) and H (an honest node). Player A builds the blocks with false transactions (e.g., double spend) at times and sustain respective build the blocks of magnitudes = ß = ß á \ ß " # " \ #ß á formalized by the process . The building blocks to player H are described by the T process similarly. Player H will generate the blocks which contain the correct [ transactions. Both players races to build their blocks (either honest or false). The processes and are specified by their transforms
The game is observed at random times in accordance with the point process which is equivalent with the duration of PoW (Proof-of-Work) completion (around 10 minutes in the Bitcoin) in the blockchain network (Kim, 2018a) :
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The game is over when on the th observation g 7 7 e f ! " ß ß á Þ 5 epoch , the collateral building blocks to player A exceeds more than the half of the 7 5 total nodes . To further formalize the game, the is introduced:
Since, an attacker is win at time otherwise an honest node generates the correct 7 / ß blocks. We shall be targeting the confined game in the view point of player A. The first passage time is the associated exit time from the confined game and the formula (2.6) 7 / will be modified as
which gives an exact definition of the model observed until
The joint functional of the blockchain network model is as 7 / Þ follows:
where indicates the total number of nodes (or ledgers) in the blockchain network. This Q functional will represent the status of attackers and honest nodes upon the exit time 7 / Þ The latter is of particular interest, we are interested in not only the prediction of catching up the blocks by attackers but also one observation prior to this. The Theorem 1 establishes an explicit formula for with (2.11) and (2.13):
The first exceed model by Dshahalow and the operator is defined as follows: (2.25)
Theorem 1: the functional of the process of (2.17) satisfies following expression: QQ
From (2.32),we can find the LST of (or ) and the generating function of (or 7 7
The decision parameters such as the first exceed observation index and the moment of / making a decision could be found from (2.34)-(2.38):
B G M G S LOCKCHAIN OVERNANCE IXED AME TRATEGY
Preliminaries
Let us consider a two-person mixed strategy game, and the player H (i.e., a defender) is the person who has two strategies at the observation moment, one step before attackers complete to generate alternative chains with dishonest transactions (i.e., double spending). Player H has the following strategies (1) doing nothing, which DoNothing  implicates that the blockchain networks are running as usual, and (2) taking the Action  preliminary action for avoiding attacks by adding honest nodes. In the view of player A (an attacker), he might succeed to catch the blocks or fail to catch (i.e., the blockchain network has been defended). So, the responses of player A would be either "Not burst" or "Burst." Let us assume that the cost for reserving the additional honest nodes is where -! ! is the portion to reserve the blocks for blockchain defense. The token provider might reserve the certain portion of nodes for protecting the values and the network. If the attacks succeed to generate alternative blocks, the network is bursted and the whole value of the tokens (or coins) will be lost and this value might be equivalent with the value F by ICO (Initial Coin Offering). It still has the chance to be bursted even if the defender (or the provider) adds the honest nodes before catching blocks by an attacker. In this case, the cost will be not only the token value but also the reservation cost for additional honest nodes. The normal form of games is as follows:
. Players:
" " " DoNothing Action Based on the above conditions, the general cost matrix at the prior time to be burst 7 /" could be composed as follows: where is the probability of bursting blockchain network (i.e., an attacker wins the ; = a b L game) and it depends on the strategic decision of player H (a defender):
It is noted that the payoffs for the reserved nodes (i.e., "Action" strategy of player H) should be better than the other strategy. Otherwise, player H does not have to spend the cost of the governance. The portion of reserved nodes for protecting a blockchain network ! depends on the payoff function and the optimal portion for the blockchain governance ! ‡ could be found as follows:
where (at the moment ),
Blockchain Governance Game
We would like to design the enhanced blockchain network governance that can take the action at the decision making moment . The governance in the blockchain is followed 7 /" by the decision making parameter. It also means that we will not take any action until the time and it still have the chance that all nodes are governed by an attacker if the 7 /" attacker catches more than the half of nodes at (i.e., . If the attacker 7 / / " " Q # ™ E catches the less than half of all nodes at (i.e., , then the defender could 7 / / " " Q # ™ E  take the action to avoid the attack at
The total cost for developing the enhanced 7 / Þ blockchain network is as follows:
Simulated Results in Practice
You may consider the private blockchain based services with offering the tokens. Even though the network is designed for controlling by the provider, the network should have at least enough power to avoid attacks not only from outsiders but also from insiders. The 51% attack still could be happened enough though the network designed based on the private blockchain. The way of manage the reliability of the network is supporting the additional nodes to give the less chance that an attacker catches the blocks with false transactions. The initial conditions of the network and the related costs could be given by gathering the data but the values in the paper (see Table 2 ) are artificially given only for demonstration purposes. Since, the model has been analytically analyzed, the values for the cost function and the probability distributions could be calculated straight forward (see Table 3 ) but, again, the values are artificially given.   Table 3 . Calculated values from the equations The above condition is directly applied to the optimization model and described by the following mathematical programming style:
and Table 2 and 3 are mapping the values for the optimization practice. We take the parameters from the above tables and calculate the total cost and that gives ¶ ! ! a b Total the minimal for . As it mentioned, is the portion that a defender reserves nodes ¶ ! ! a b Total to protect the network from an attackers. As an illustration (see Figure 1) , the calculation using MS-Excel yields, that result in making the minimum cost 7,129,333 [USD] when the portion of 13.4%. It means that the service provider should keep 13,400 nodes additionally for managing the risk from attackers. The moment of releasing the additional nodes will be the time (2.31) when is one 7 /" step prior than the time that an attacker catches more than half of the whole blocks (i.e., 7 / ).
CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is establishing the theoretical framework of the blackchain governance game with the explicit equations for developing the blackchain network security for avoid the attacks for decentralized networks. As it said on the title, the paper is the condensed summary for only introducing the concept of blockchain governance game for the secured decentralized network security. The core parts of the research including the proof of the Theorem 1, the actual calculation of the probabilities for the decision making parameters and the demonstration based on the analysis are not included in this trailer but these will be fully deployed in the final paper. The blockchain governance game could be designed by gathering all related data from real networks without calculating mathematical functions. This research (even this trailer) will be helpful for whom considers the initial con offering (ICO) or launching new blockchain based services with the enhanced security features.
